

Jean Monnet Network DESCnet
Developing European Studies in the Caucasus
Newsletter 3/2016

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1 – Editorial

This summer Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University hosted an intensive summer school, which coincided with two side, but not less important events - the "Georgia's European Way" Conference and annual meeting of the DESCnet consortium. Both came at a very pivotal moment of unprecedented challenges for the destiny of mutual coexistence of peoples and nations. The focus on Europeanisation, with a special emphasis on the Caucasus, is a concept that today conveys both unprecedented challenges and immense opportunities. These developments are relevant not only for the Caucasus region, but for the entire continent, and beyond. The Caucasus region is facing numerous challenges in terms of stability, security, and regional consolidation that the Western European countries have faced in the early post-war period, and that are re-emerging, given today's circumstances. Some countries of the area, from Turkey to Georgia are committed to full integration in the Euro-Atlantic community, all the countries of the area - regardless of their preferences for specific forms of cooperation - have interest in peace, cooperation, and development. This is a common aspiration that emerged clearly also during the discussions of the conference "Georgia's European way" which open the doors to the summer school participants provided a constituent part of the learning experience.

The First Deputy State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Mr. Archil Karaulashvili welcomed representatives of 17 countries, who joined us in Batumi for a vibrant and engaging learning experience. So, my foremost obligation is to thank the State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, our DESCnet partners, in particular the Universities of Graz and Tartu, as well as all those who contributed to this largest-ever DESCnet event. You have all helped us to promote the idea of European Studies for Georgia, and I sincerely hope that a piece of Batumi will remain in your hearts!

I look forward to continuing efforts to bring the subject of European Studies to our universities. Our foreign partners who we appreciate for their support, are research-driven universities. This is, quite frankly speaking, not the reality in our region.

We need to think of new ways of bringing European Studies to our respective curricula, perhaps through concerted efforts using EU Capacity Building funding for curriculum reform (CBHE). I welcome the decision to create an Association for European Studies for the Caucasus and to adopt a DESCnet Working Papers series. Likewise, offering a total of five seasonal schools shows the right emphasis on the needs of our region. But while we are contemplating all this, DESCnet should be thinking ahead.

Fresh lymph is vital for every plant to grow and develop prosperously, and these are the new lymph of fresh ideas and energies to commonly take care of that fragile and strong tree, which is called regional peace and cooperation. On the other hand, today the very core of the European Union is facing unprecedented challenges of economic, security, and identity nature. Our history teaches us that we have overcome similar critical moments in the past by opting for more integration and cooperation - that is, more solidarity among peoples. In this existential challenge that we are witnessing the contribution of broader Europe is vital, as every attempt to renovate our common house with the exclusion of half of the continent is inevitably destined to fail. This is basically the goal of our network DESCnet. To develop a spring board for building the foundations and strengthening the roots of tomorrow's Europe and global community! We are all active builders of a better tomorrow together!

Yours,

Adam Makharadze

Dean of the Law Faculty

Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University



2 — Upcoming DESCnet events

There are three DESCnet events coming up in 2017, the preparation of which is now central for all DESCnet consortium members.

DESCnet Winter School 2017, Stavropol, Russia

27 February - 4 March 2017

The Stavropol Winter School 2017 will be a follow-up to the 2016 School in Pyatigorsk and will be this time focusing on the topic of corruption (see some thoughts on the issue by Thomas Kruessmann in the following section, p. 8-17). More than ever, the challenge is to view common problems of the Caucasus from a Russian perspective and to draw on the potential and scholarly insight of our partners at the North-Caucasus Federal University.

The winter school will host up to 30 participants from the region and last for a week. The call for participation will be available in November 2016 online at www.descnet.wordpress.com.



Monument in Stavropol dedicated to the First Teacher in front of the North Caucasus Federal State University

AESC First Annual Convention, Istanbul, Turkey

27 - 28 April 2017 (tbc)

The Association of European Studies in Caucasus, which is currently in the process of being founded, is scheduled to hold its first Members' Meeting along with its First Annual Convention, at Yeditepe University in Istanbul. We look forward to creating a meeting place for all our DESCnet Young Researchers, consortium members and scholars from other institutions in the region and wider. The convention will coincide with the third annual consortium meeting of the DESCnet partners. Stay tuned!



Yeditepe State University

DESCnet Summer School in Yerevan, Armenia

July 2017 (TBC)

The school organized by Yerevan State University will aim at spreading knowledge and examine interrelated processes of European integration and energy security issues in the South Caucasus, Russia and Turkey with a special view of challenging geopolitical situations in the region, existing conflicts, closed borders as well as economic developments. The main part of the course will focus on EU's energy policies and the problems of energy security in conflict-stricken regions, review challenges and possible developments in a view of changing geopolitical situation.

Similarly, the seasonal school will host up to 30 students from all countries of the wider Caucasus region and Europe, however will be also open for public to attend public lectures. The call for participation will be available in early 2017 online at www.descnet.wordpress.com.

3 — Recent DESCnet events

Summer School Batumi

"Unpacking Europeanisation in the Caucasus and the Black Sea Region: Economic, Legal and Social Contexts" 15 – 24 July 2016

This year's annual Summer School organised by the Universities of Tartu (Estonia), Graz (Austria) and Shota Rustaveli State University in Batumi, Georgia, brought together students from 17 different countries. Participants were not only from the countries of the region, but wider Europe as well. The School also brought together dozens of scholars and academics from all above mentioned universities as well as from different countries of the region. The focus of the School was multidisciplinary, diverse and broad, which allowed students as well as experts and scholars to touch in their lectures on wider topics and present the ongoing Europeanisation processes in the countries of the South Caucasus from different perspectives, be it legal studies, sociology, political science or international relations.

The main focus of the Summer School, i.e. European integration and economic development in the South Caucasus, is timely and actual. As the EU is going through crisis after crisis with refugees flooding its borders, the issue of "Brexit" and others, countries of the Eastern Partnership including the South Caucasus seem to be facing more challenges on their way of getting closer to the European institutions.

This Summer School offered a wonderful opportunity to students to share their experiences, thoughts and ideas. Local students from Georgia, Azerbaijan or Armenia had their first-hand experiences with Europeanisation processes ongoing in these states, while students from the rest of the world brought their own stories. Either about successful cases of European integration, like countries of Central and Eastern Europe, or about the discourse of EU enlargement and neighbourhood policies in the Western part of the continent.

It is important to note that the programme of the Summer School included trips to various state institutions, such as the Georgian Constitutional Court. Students got first-hand experience from local civil servants about the implementation of the reforms on

the way to European integration.

Finally, as the South Caucasus moves closer to the West it becomes vital to develop and further advance European studies in these countries. By holding this Summer School, another important milestone was achieved on the road to developing European studies in the region. Within the scope of this project, scholars and experts from EU Member States and the Eastern Partnership countries shared their knowledge and experience, and they considerably advanced European studies through co-operation.

Shota Kakabadze, University of Tartu

DESCnet consortium meeting 15 – 17 July 2016

During the first three days of the Batumi Summer School, the representatives of DESCnet members held their first regular consortium meeting at Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University. Apart from internal matters such as budget, reporting, etc. two important decisions were taken:

1) to create an Association of European Studies for the Caucasus as a non-commercial organisation under Georgian law, based on the statute that had been developed by Thomas Krueßmann, Gaga Gabrichidze and Oliver Reisner. The Association will be open both to individual researchers and to universities and other legal entities interested in European Studies. DESCnet members will be represented in an Advisory Board.

2) to create an AESC Working Paper Series instead of a new scholarly journal. It is hoped that a working paper series will be closer to the needs of young researchers who are pondering publication and who are invited to use the series as an intermediary step towards publication in high-level international journals.

Olga Bogdanova, University of Tartu

4 – Disseminating DESCnet

CASCADE Final Conference „The Democracy-Security Nexus in and around the Caucasus” 20 – 21 October 2016, Brussels

Benedikt Harzl will present a paper with the (tentative) title "Self-determination as Opium of the Peoples: Engaging Abkhazia".



International Conference „The Role of Law and Legal Education in the Development of Transition Countries: Azerbaijan as an Example”

24-25 November 2016, Baku

Thomas Krueßmann will present a paper on the topic „Teaching Anti-Corruption and Integrity in the Caucasus and Black Sea Region(s)". The aim of this conference is to bring together scholars studying the role and impact of law on the development of countries with transition economies, working on legal methodology and on reforms and methods of legal education. Organizers welcome theoretical as well as empirical studies in the spheres of civil and public law. The paper will be an expanded scholarly version of the opinion presented in this Newsletter.

Disseminating Knowledge on EU-Georgian Association Agreement among Academic Communities in Georgia (EUGA)

The European Union Studies Association (EUSA) – a member of the European Community Studies Association (ECSA) – is an academic forum that focuses on interdisciplinary research in EU subject area. Within the framework of the project which will be financed under the Jean Monnet Program, EUSA plans to carry out information and communication activities on the EU-Georgia Association Agreement / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) conceived and tailored specifically for the segments of specific audience. The project's target groups are: academics, students and researchers at the universities in Tbilisi and in regions of Georgia. The project aims to

cover the capital and major cities in Georgia (Gori, Telavi, Kutaisi, Zugdidi, Akhaltsikhe and Batumi). University students and professors coming from different disciplines (e.g. international relations, politics, law, economics, etc.) will be engaged in an information campaign and communication activities conducted by EUSA with the aim to allow full illustration of AA provision, with a special focus on DCFTA. Throughout the series of open lectures and international academic conferences, the project aims at bringing together international and local scholars and professors, as well as experts, policy makers and diplomats to stimulate open discussions on the EU. Moreover, with the help of dedicated website and newsletter service the project aims at better informing targeted audience on developments related to the EU.

The Jean Monnet Support to Associations grant has been awarded to Prof Gaga Gabrichidze (New Vision University, Georgia)

Jean Monnet Chair at Ilia State University

The new *Jean Monnet Chair* will be held by *Prof Oliver Reisner*, who combines in-depth EU-Georgia experience of co-operation with academic studies of East European History and a PhD in nation-building of Georgia. Having implemented a project for civic integration under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights in Georgia's minority regions (2003-2005), he worked at the EU Delegation to Georgia for ten years (2005-2015). Built around the academic concept of "Europeanisation", the new Jean Monnet Chair sets out to assess the impact of EU-Georgia co-operation in institutional, societal as well as discourse terms. Together with students and international colleagues, criteria and indicators for an in-depth measurement of changes in society and the role played by the EU shall be elaborated.

Thus, new courses will introduce new aspects of EU integration studies complementing the existing courses and research on the EU in international relations and political sciences at Ilia University. The elaboration of a Georgian language study reader in European Union Studies as another objective will provide for greater internal consistency of the courses offered.

4 — Disseminating DESCnet

Jean Monnet Teaching Module "Migration policy challenges in the EU and the South Caucasus (MiPEG)"

The new teaching module MiPEG at Yerevan State University is designed to address legal, political, cultural and social aspects of migration in the region and the EU. The Module is primarily designed for graduate level students of MA in European Studies (compulsory courses), however its content, objectives and teaching methodology are built in the format allowing students majoring in social sciences, migration studies, law to participate in the whole module or choose one of the courses (elective courses).

The interdisciplinary study of the concept of migration will allow students to understand migration, its main aspects and policies from various perspectives. The module is divided into three courses that will be delivered by a team of professors from various departments of Yerevan State University. Throughout the project, apart from teaching, a series of round tables and workshops will be organised to bring together academia, experts, students, policy makers and international organisations to stimulate open discussions on the EU, migration policies and its challenges.

The Jean Monnet Teaching Module grant has been awarded to Dr Artur Ghazinyan (Yerevan State University)

5 — Related events

Academic Swiss Caucasus Net (ASCN) Final Conference „Bringing the Strands Together: New Prospects for the Social Sciences?“ 18-19 November 2016, Tbilisi

This final ASCN conference bring partners together to discuss – for the last time in the context of the ASCN programme – the results of their research projects and to present the future direction of their research. The conference poses a two-fold question: what have we achieved: a) in developing social sciences in the region and b) in addressing critical and relevant questions about society and politics in the region?

It aims to gather the ASCN project partners, scholars and researchers from various disciplines of the social sciences (political science, sociology, anthropology, etc.) dealing with the South Caucasus. More specifically, the conference will provide opportunities and a forum for researchers to discuss their findings and to think about ASCN achievements.

International Conference „European Values and Identity: Multiple Dimensions of Europeanization“

25-26 October 2016 at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University

EU integration and the accompanying Europeanisation process as a mechanism of spreading the EU norms and values, are of utmost importance to contemporary Georgia, especially after signing the EU-Georgia Association Agreement on June 27, 2014. The Association Agreement forms the basis for the political development, access to the common European market and establishment of European values and standards; Thus, it is essential to gain a proper understanding of the political, economic and cultural dimensions of Europeanisation and deepen the respective academic discourse.

6 – News, opinions and comments

Towards Fresh Scholarship: A New Handbook on EU Law and the European Integration of Georgia

EU law is a complex and fascinating subject of study, especially for students from Eastern European countries. The handbook that is now under preparation aims to illuminate the EU legal processes and to depict some dimensions of the dynamic relationship between the EU and Georgia. The objective is to support the teaching process of EU law at Georgian universities and therefore to incorporate in an integrated manner the basics of EU law together with topics related to the European integration of Georgia.

The textbook has a twofold objective, firstly to present an introduction to EU law, including the topics: (1) The history of European integration; (2) External action of the EU; (3) The EU institutions; (4) Human rights in the EU; and secondly, to focus on the European integration process of Georgia and to examine the issues: (1) Legal basis for EU - Georgia relations; (2) Security challenges of the EaP: The case of Georgia and Ukraine; (3) The role of the Georgian court system in the European integration process; (4) Implementation of the Association Agreement: The case of Georgia and Moldova and (5) Anti-corruption policy in Georgia.

It is worth mentioning that studying materials on EU law in Georgia, as well as in Armenia and Azerbaijan, are quite rare. This is true especially for, handbooks that are available in the native languages of students coming from the region. Therefore, utmost attention has been paid to the existing textbooks in the region, i.e. 'European Union Law' (ed. Gabrichidze, G., 2012, in Georgian) and 'European Law' (Европейское право: учебник и практикум для академического бакалавриата; eds. Abdullin A.I. and Bezborodov Yu.S., Yurayt 2016, in Russian). Those handbooks are examining legal aspects of European integration and are tailored to a wide range of universities beyond the borders of the EU.

The proposed new handbook on "EU Law and European Integration of Georgia" is the collective effort of Georgian scholars and scholars belonging to EU Member states.

Their co-operation was established in Batumi where since 2013 an annual summer school 'EU Law in the South Caucasus' (EULISC), with support of the Jean Monnet Program, is held. We are delighted, in particular, to continue collaboration with Thomas Kruessmann, Hubert Isak and Anita Ziegerhofer who are all contributing to this handbook.

Our project gains additional importance in terms of the on-going implementation process of the Association Agreement (including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area) in Georgia and therefore an increased demand in studying materials about the substance of EU law, as well as Georgia's political association and economic integration with the EU.

The handbook will be published in English as well as in Georgian. Thus, it will give to Georgian students interested in EU law the possibility to study this field in their native language. The goal of the editor is to promote teaching of EU law at Georgian universities which are facing an insufficiency of materials available in Georgian. Together with legal analyses this book provides case studies and practice-related examinations. Therefore, the handbook should be of great interest to Georgian and foreign students, as well as to practitioners in the fields of law, political science and European studies.



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Teaching Anti-Corruption and Integrity in the Caucasus and Black Sea Region(s)

„I hadn't paid a bribe in my home country [i.e. Ukraine] until it was time to defend my doctoral dissertation. I tucked \$200 in page six of my manuscript before I handed it to my adviser. His department colleagues insisted on the illicit practice when I complained that my professor refused to touch my thesis for more than three weeks. The deadline was approaching. Now I watched as my esteemed professor of modern Ukrainian literature thumbed through the pages. My face turned red with shame but I'll never forget what he said when he found what he was looking for: 'Now I see it. Your work is good.'"¹

Introduction

There is hardly a topic in the current transformations that is as central as corruption. While anti-corruption efforts have come to form a core part of the Europeanisation agenda,² their roots go back to the nineties when the futility of much development work was revealed and, at the same time, globalisation turned the world into a corporate playing field. Since then, a wealth of tools and instruments has been invented. Any student who is now interested in issues of anti-corruption and integrity can be certain to find abundant materials. From a teacher's perspective, turning these materials into a coherent academic subject is the first challenge. But corruption is not a subject like any other. If taught properly, it should affect every student's moral compass and become a catalyst for the development of integrity and professional ethics.

Anybody who has ever been forced to pay a bribe e.g. in a university setting will remember „turning red with shame". Bribing your teacher, as compared to a traffic police or customs officer, seems like the ultimate betrayal of the notion of the intellectual community between scholar / teacher and student, and it throws into doubt the entire system of values and goals that higher education stands for. In its effect, it is as pernicious as doping in sports. And when the shame is overcome, the result will be a graduate who is „street-wise", who is ready to play the game and expect nothing less from his or her colleagues.

Against this background, the purpose of this paper is twofold. It serves as a reflection on the state of anti-corruption and pro-integrity efforts in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s)³ and suggests a model whereby DESCnet's Association of European Studies for the Caucasus (AESC) could become a catalyst in bringing blended learning / teaching on anti-corruption and pro-integrity to the region(s). At the same time, it develops the argument that the „toolkit approach" favoured by many international organisations, in particular the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and donors across the world is not sufficient to address the root causes of corruption in the region(s). Instead, it is suggested to follow Klitgaard's seminal definition of corruption⁴ with its emphasis on shaping incentives and disincentives, and to place anti-corruption and pro-integrity policies more firmly into the context of Europeanisation.

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1 Iuliia Mendel, In Ukraine's Universities, [Trading Bribes for Diplomas](#).

2 There is a whole strand of literature that deals with the role of anti-corruption in Europeanisation, in particular how instruments that are designed to support the transformation process actually lead to the stabilisation of neo-patrimonial features. See, e.g., Tanja A. Börzel / Yasemin Pamuk, Pathologies of Europeanisation: Fighting Corruption in the South Caucasus, *West European Politics* 2012 Vol. 35 No. 1 pp. 79-97 and Tanja A. Börzel / Vera van Hüllen, State Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the South Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters, *Governance* 2014 Vol. 27 No. 4 pp. 613-634. This perspective, while important, will not be discussed here, as the emphasis of this paper is on the classroom experience of anti-corruption.

3 The reason for speaking not of one region is that there is neither a clear Black Sea regional identity nor a distinct Caucasus regional identity. It is probably pointless to argue about specific affiliations of individual countries, as the problems are largely overlapping.

4 Corruption (C) = Monopoly Power (M) plus Discretion (D) minus Accountability, C=M+D-A. See Robert Klitgaard, *Controlling Corruption*, University of California Press: Berkeley 1988.

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As such, they should be integrally linked to the support of civil society, independent media, independence and integrity of the judiciary, and open government.

What role to play for the AESC?

Comparing the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) to the Western Balkans⁵ as the other pre-eminent theatre of Europeanisation, there is a marked difference in the prevalence of regional anti-corruption and pro-integrity initiatives and how they translate into academia. While the Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME) have united the world's leading business schools and faculties of business and management in developing educational standards,⁶ law schools and faculties have stayed behind. In the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) there is no network of law schools and law faculties committed to fighting corruption.⁷ Likewise, there is no regional anti-corruption initiative similar to the Regional Anti-corruption Initiative (RAI)⁸ which, among other goals, set out to establish a Framework for Integrated Anti-Corruption Legal Education in the region.⁹

When it comes to inter-regional associations in general, the picture is more homogeneous. The European Partners against Corruption (EPAC) and the European Contact-Point Network against Corruption (EACN)¹⁰ are represented quite well in the Western

Balkans. In the Black Sea region the representation is more uneven,¹¹ and from among Caucasus countries only Azerbaijan is a member. By comparison, the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) has a balanced geographical reach that includes both the Black Sea and the Caucasus region(s).¹² Finally, the OECD's Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ACN)¹³ features Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine as participating countries. Its major activity is the implementation of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan as a sub-regional peer review programme launched in 2003. However, none of these associations focuses on anti-corruption and pro-integrity education, neither in business nor in law.

Looking at individual countries in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s), PRME membership of business schools and management faculties is rather weak: while there are 7 members from Turkey and 5 from Russia, Georgia and Ukraine hold two memberships each, Armenia none and Azerbaijan one. Whether, in fact, principles of responsible management education have been mainstreamed into curricula needs to be revealed. Law curricula typically do not provide for teaching the subject of anti-corruption. The criminalisation of bribery is usually covered in advanced criminal law classes, while administrative and civil sanctions are usually not covered at all. Issues of enforcement partly fall into criminal procedure classes.

Alternative models, esp. the creation of anti-corruption agencies, may be treated in constitutional or administrative law. Compliance issues and the rights and obligations of employees of corporations do fall at best into labour law classes, but there is no coherent treatment of anti-corruption compliance in the private sector. Other disciplines like Global Studies offer a comparative perspective on approaches adopted in a large number of countries. Economics may present and challenge some of the behavioural underpinnings of corrupt behaviour, and Business Studies may reflect on suitable corporate structures to avoid managerial liability.

All in all, in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) by the year 2016 we (still) do not see a coherent

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5 Speaking of South Eastern Europe would be misleading here because Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova are also members of the Black Sea region.

6 See <<http://www.unprme.org/about-prme/index.php>>. For more details on the PRME Working Group on Anti-Corruption in Curriculum Change, see below.

7 Compare, for instance, the well-developed [South East European Law School Network](#) (SEELS). It is true that the [Black Sea Universities Network](#) has an impressive reach including both South East European, Black Sea and Caucasus universities. But anti-corruption is not among the co-operation topics.

8 RAI was created in 2007 as a follow up to the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative. From the Black Sea region, Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania are members.

9 To achieve this goal, in 2012 a South East European Judicial Training Network (SEEJTN) was established. For a later phase, it was envisioned to create a [common platform](#) between SEELS and SEEJTN as a way to developing learning information tools. It is unclear, however, at which stage of realisation this project currently is.

10 See www.epac-eacn.org.

11 Members are Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine.

12 See www.iaaca.org.

13 See <http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/>.

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treatment of anti-corruption and pro-integrity as an academic discipline. And the incentives to introduce such a discipline may not be overwhelmingly strong, either. Indeed, as long as university rectorates need to rely on a few faculties, esp. law faculties, as „cash cows“ for their budgets, there can be no sizable fail rates in the large group of students known as *kontraktniki*, i.e. those who pay for their education themselves. So there is often a tacit acknowledgement that integrity standards need to remain „flexible“ in order to accommodate the special wishes and needs of those who are paying large tuition fees. This, of course, does not preclude the introduction of anti-corruption and pro-integrity as disciplines in law and business studies, but it makes it harder to justify the real-life concessions which seem unavoidable.

The AESC will for sure not be able to change this picture. But it may very well be suited to bridge the time until the emergence of topical regional initiatives and offer impulses for offering extra-curricular classes „off the shelf“ that universities would otherwise have a hard time to come by. However, similar to the task of squaring the circle, there are a number of barriers to overcome.

- The lecturer of the class should not be part of the traditional faculty. He or she should be outside of the networks of favours, career expectations and dependencies. Still, inviting „fly-in“ faculty to teach the subject of anti-corruption full-time is too costly.
- In order to obtain sizable (ETCS) credits, there should be a normal workload for every student. Still, students are overtasked with their regular classes and will have no motivation to spend even more time on a class that is not strictly required to achieve their diploma.
- Students from countries with a high level of corruption and years of anti-corruption propaganda will not expect that a new class will be any different than the window-dressing they have seen.

Breaking through these multiple barriers is surely not an easy task. But why would a delegated AESC lecturer be able to do a better job than a local faculty teacher? One reason is definitely the different mission and motivation that the delegated lecturer will bring.

Like the AESC itself, he or she should be a proactive force of change. Heralding Europeanisation as the AESC's central mission, he or she should strive to offer benefits that are complementary to the academic offers that a university in the region(s) can make.

The reason for such a dedicated approach lies in a certain change of paradigm in the EU itself. While the EU had for a decade or so practiced a double-standard in preaching anti-corruption abroad while leaving its Member States a free hand outside the realm of the protection of the Community's financial interests, the dynamics have now come around full circle to formulating a unified value-based message. Not only are the Association Agreements concluded with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia consistent in their anti-corruption message. The EU Commission in its ENP Review also emphasises stabilisation and economic growth along with public administration reform as key goals¹⁴ – and all include, of course, vigorous anti-corruption measures. Corruption is among the „EU crimes“ for which the Lisbon Treaty gave the EU a legislative competence to determine minimum requirements,¹⁵ and it is intimately linked to the realisation of the fundamental freedoms for which ancillary criminal competences are now provided.¹⁶ The same position is reflected in the European Agenda on Security.¹⁷ Finally, in 2016 we are expecting the second EU Anti-Corruption Report and with it a fresh boost for anti-corruption initiatives.

Looking at all these developments, it is clear that promoting an agenda of anti-corruption and pro-integrity teaching in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) is a call of the time. Still, the ubiquity of anti-corruption rhetoric makes it difficult to break through the „glass walls“ of student expectations. Designing a class format that will address these concerns is not an easy task.

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¹⁴ Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions „Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy“ of 18 November 2015, JOIN(2015) 50 final.

¹⁵ Art 83 (1) TFEU.

¹⁶ Art 83 (2) TFEU.

¹⁷ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions „The European Agenda on Security“ of 28 April 2015, COM(2015) 185 final.

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Is corruption different in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region(s)?

„Fighting corruption is like fishing on Discovery Channel: catch, show and release.“¹⁸ This anecdote which recently circulated in social media captures some of the specifics of (anti-) corruption in the Russian-speaking world (including the Caucasus) that would not normally come to the mind of a Western anti-corruption expert. It points to the idea that the way corruption is defined and understood is a function of the need to show some result of fighting it. „Catching“, „showing“ and „releasing“ have all their own logic and rationale. Therefore, the construction of corruption and the appearance of fighting it go hand in hand.

In the media, the aforementioned pun is mostly used to criticise the effectiveness of the fight against corruption. On a deeper level, it reflects an anthropological school of thought that understands the meaning of corruption as part of social reality by framing it in its socio-cultural context (e.g. socialist traditions, post-socialist transitions and the formation of social capital).¹⁹ From this perspective, every country is unique and deserves to be treated on its own. For anti-corruption, this means that what is „fish“, what is „catch“ and why a certain catch gets to be „shown“ and then „released“ needs to be understood in the socio-cultural context. I will come back to this approach in the latter part of this chapter.

By comparison, the mainstream anti-corruption discourse favoured by international (donor) organisations is one of a universalist expert knowledge that needs to be brought „top down“ to the countries in transformation.²⁰ Representatives of this position

start from a unitary definition of (most often public) corruption²¹ and trace its perception over time.²² Looking at TI's latest CPI for the year 2015, we find Georgia as the frontrunner among the countries of the Caucasus region with the lowest perception of corruption in the public sphere, now ranking at # 48 out of 168 countries measured. Turkey is at # 66, Armenia at # 95, Moldova at # 103, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation at # 119 and Ukraine at # 130. While not disputing that „naming and shaming“ can sometimes be useful, a perceptions-based ranking is inherently problematic. Clearly, the more awareness-raising campaigns are being conducted, the subtler the perceptions of corruption become. Other, more fundamental criticisms are brought forward from an anthropological perspective. As corruption is culturally embedded, there is no „one“ definition of corruption and a macro-perspective on entire countries, repeated in annual intervals, based on a cookie-cutter type of definition is unable to grasp the reality of the phenomena under observation.

But there are also reasons specific to the region(s). Since the early days of the Rose Revolution, Georgia has made waves by rigorously suppressing petty corruption in the public sphere and being the first country to systematically use new technologies like e-governance to minimise the scope of situations in which citizens might be asked to pay for the „facilitation“ of services. In fact, the World Bank has had a large stake in these reforms and used their positive outcome to propagate the approaches it had supported. Thus, Georgia became the poster boy of a successful anti-corruption policy, and the

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18 „Борьба с коррупцией – это как рыбалка на канале Дискавери: поймали, показали, отпустили.“ (author unknown). In other versions, this anecdote is minted specifically on [Ukraine](#) or on [Russia](#).

19 Davide Torsello / Bertrand Venard, The Anthropology of Corruption, Journal of Management Inquiry 2016 Vol. 25 No. 1 pp. 34-54. More specifically on the region, see Diana Schmidt-Pfister / Holger Moroff (eds.), Fighting Corruption in Eastern Europe. A Multi-level Perspective, Routledge 2013. See also the final report of the FP 6 „[Crime and Culture](#)“ project led by the University of Konstanz.

20 Three assumptions are underlying this discourse: (1) corruption is a universal problem; (2) corruption can be dealt with as a policy or managerial issue, without necessarily becoming 'political'; (3) corruption can be documented and

measured so that the factors that stimulate or prevent it can be isolated. See Lilli Di Puppò, Anti-corruption Interventions in Georgia, Global Crime 2010 Vol. 11 No. 2 pp. 220-236 (222).

21 By contrast, the definition most commonly used today is the one that became popular through Transparency International (TI): „Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain“. But experts agree that the concept of corruption is potentially even broader. In fact, the more successful awareness-raising campaigns are being conducted, the more people perceive corruption all around them.

22 Most prominent in this respect is, of course, the annual [TI Corruption Perceptions Index](#) (CPI). Beyond that, other rankings have been developed by a variety of donors, such as the World Bank Governance Indicators, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, and the Freedom House index.

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more self-congratulating publications appeared²³ the firmer the perception took root that indeed the struggle against corruption in Georgia has been led vigorously and successfully.²⁴ Turkey's record in anti-corruption will surely need to be re-written, as President Erdogan's antiputsch measures targeted a number of media known for their coverage of corruption issues, including investigations against the sons of President Erdogan in the 2013 „gas for gold” scandal. The judiciary which has never been fiercely independent in the first place is now suspected of being undermined by Gülen forces, and it remains to be seen how effectively civil society will be able to work in the future.

In terms of perception, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation are more or less in one group of countries. But the differences are stark. In Russia, if it wasn't for Alexey Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation,²⁵ there is hardly any interest in disclosing corruption. Instead, there is such an entrenched expectation that holders of office enrich themselves, that not even the most notorious cases raise an eyebrow anymore. Since civil society has been stifled by the NGO „foreign agent” reforms of 2012 and media have been brought under more or less complete state control, there is hardly an independent channel left to survey the ruling elite's pervasive influence over the country.²⁶ Armenia, by contrast, is run by a small clique

of people with little popular legitimacy²⁷ and, having sold out the country to the Eurasian Economic Union, with an increasing motivation to engage in rent-seeking while still in power. Azerbaijan, by contrast, is much less „in the pocket” of Russia, but pursuing its own authoritarian brand of politics with a rigorous suppression of civil society. Ukraine is perhaps the most problematic case. While the Euromaidan symbolised for many the desire to break free from post-Soviet traditions, the Western image of Ukraine is most substantially marred by a discourse of „systemic” and „widespread” corruption, a catastrophic state of the economy and pervasive oligarchs in control of businesses. EU support policies do focus on the issue of corruption,²⁸ but it sometimes seems that the perception of a high level of corruption is self-serving, as the EU and its Member States are rather careful to support the colossal task of restructuring the country.²⁹

Thus, boiling down the corruption situation in each country to one marker of perception of public corruption is misleading. Perception is also not good at distinguishing between petty and grand corruption. When the fight against petty corruption in Georgia dominated the headlines, a lot of people were positively impressed. But they remained unaware of grand corruption which mostly took the form of nepotism and trading in influence. In other countries, there were similar success stories in fighting petty corruption, but the perception remained fixed on grand corruption. For example, Belarus which ranks at # 107 in the CPI is, by all impressions, virtually corruption-free when it comes to the everyday experience of its citizens.

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23 See World Bank, [Fighting Corruption in Public Services](#), Chronicling Georgia's Reforms, The World Bank 2012. Similar Christofer Berglund / Johan Engvall, [How Georgia Stamped Out Corruption on Campus](#), Foreign Policy of 3 September 2015, and Robert Klitgaard, Addressing Corruption Together, OECD Background Paper 2015, pp. 32-33.

24 How this narrative of success was constructed and what underlying contradictions in the case of Georgia existed is clearly shown in the research of Lili Di Puccio. See her paper „The Construction of Success in Anti-corruption Activity in Georgia” in East European Politics 2014 Vol. 30 No. 1 pp. 105-122 as well as the book chapter „Marketing Reforms. The Dimension of Narratives in Georgia's Fight against Corruption” in Stéphane Voell / Iwona Kaliszewska (eds.), State and Legal Practice in the Caucasus, Routledge 2015, pp. 223-242.

25 See <https://fbk.info/english/about/>

26 This is not to say that there is not a host of agencies, departments and state-sponsored so-called civil society organisations which are involved in anti-corruption activities one way or the other. See the account of Olga Litzenberger, Historical View of Corruption, Anti-corruption Activities and Integrity-building Activities in Russia, in Integrity Action (ed.), [Live and Work with Integrity. You Can Do It!](#) London 2015, pp. 204-2013.

27 This became clear when in March 2015 the major civil society organisations of the country, united in the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Civil Society Organisations along with the Public Network for Co-operation with State Authorities, refused to nominate candidates for the new Council on Combating Corruption which the Government planned to install instead of an UNCAC-required anti-corruption agency. For details, see Marat Atovmyan, Corruption, Anti-corruption and Integrity in Armenia, in Integrity Action (ed.), [Live and Work with Integrity. You Can Do It!](#) London 2015, pp. 168-175 (ibid.).

28 See the websites of the [EU Advisory Mission EUAM](#) and the [EU Border Assistance Mission EUBAM](#).

29 [Impression](#) about the breadth of donor activities in the field of anti-corruption.

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This freedom from petty corruption is to a large extent due to the threat of rigorous repression. Hence, the overall repressive nature of the Belarusian regime is much more strongly reflected in the perception-based ranking of the country. Similarly, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have employed technological advances like e-governance in a push to increase transparency and public accountability. But again, in the case of Azerbaijan the semblance of a vigorous fight against corruption impacted much less on the perception of corruption than the overall neo-patrimonial approach of President Aliyev's regime.

Indeed, in a situation where now most if not all countries of the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) have ratified the major international anti-corruption conventions and submitted to monitoring and peer evaluation mechanisms, there is a need to „show“ progress, at least in areas which do not hurt the interests of those in power.³⁰ Students of anti-corruption must be aware of the most important frameworks in international law and the state of the respective monitoring exercises. But looking at problems and gaps only from the perspective of a lack of implementation creates the wrong picture.³¹

Coming back to the idea of „fishing on Discovery Channel“, if the analysis of corruption is to deliver a methodological basis for designing a regional anti-corruption initiative, it is necessary to look at the social construction of corruption and to understand why it is held to be „systemic and widespread“ in the countries of the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s). This perspective is, of course, also not without problems. There is now a rich international debate on anti-corruption advances around the world,³² and *prima facie* there is not any reason to claim that corruption in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions(s) is just „so much more“ systemic and widespread than in Latin America, South East Asia, Southern Africa or the Arab world. Still, across all regional evidence, there is the

fundamental belief in all anthropological approaches that anti-corruption is not about „rooting out an evil“ from the top,³³ but about changing cultures from the bottom.

Very often, the root causes of corruption and the reasons for sluggish enforcement, implementation problems and ominous gaps in legislation are the same. What is necessary therefore is to place corruption into the wider context of open government, a self-driven anti-corruption and pro-integrity effort, public scrutiny through independent media and an active civil society, and finally an independent judiciary. Changing a culture of corruption is possible! Adapting expert-driven legal frameworks and introducing best practices is needed, but instead of the now dominant „toolkit approach“ by which individual features prescribed by international organisations and supported by donors get introduced, implemented and evaluated, the anti-corruption effort needs to be built on incentives and the idea of „checks and balances“ to the extent that they are part of the local culture or can be nurtured to become more visible. It is only when self-interest is harnessed that the incentives can be brought to bear for a real anti-corruption and pro-integrity effort.

In the public sphere, even in traditional „toolkit“ approaches this idea is now expressed by the requirement of an independent anti-corruption body³⁴ that within government is exclusively tasked with bringing the anti-corruption agenda to the line ministries. There is a host of problems in achieving this goal and a large amount of literature now revolving around the question how such bodies, commonly called ACAs (anti-corruption agencies), can be made effective and prevented from capture by vested interests. Studying ACAs in comparative perspective is therefore an important approach in designing an anti-corruption curriculum.

Self-interest can also be used in the private sector. In what originally is a U.S.-approach, the interest of a disgruntled bidder in a public auction or tender who believes to have been treated unfairly is a powerful tool to bring action, primarily through the courts.

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30 See di Puccio (2014) 113 on the background to the 2005 Georgian National Anti-corruption Strategy where GRECO recommendations ran counter to the Government's preferred policy approach.

31 An example of such a wrong perspective is Vahan Asatryan / Arpine Karapetyan / Arzu Abdullayeva / Tamar Pataraia: [State of the Fight Against Corruption in the South Caucasus](#), CASCADE European Policy Brief, August 2015.

32 See, for instance, the very interesting overview of the [Wilson Center](#) and the [Global Anti-Corruption Blog](#).

33 See, for example, the [speech of Hillary Clinton](#) on International Anti-Corruption Day 2009.

34 Art 6 UNCAC. See additionally the [Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies](#).

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Art 1 of the Civil Law Convention against Corruption which had been widely ratified throughout the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s),³⁵ expresses this idea more broadly.³⁶ The effectiveness of this mechanism, however, critically hinges on two factors: openness of government and independence and integrity of courts. Accessibility of information, accountability and transparency are key to preventing corruption in the public sphere. Many governments are purposefully hiding taxpayers' money in off-budget funds, public tenders get manipulated for private gain, and a host of administrative resources is brought to bear for the sake of rent-seeking. When looking at the Black Sea and South Caucasus region(s), we see that current levels of openness of government are quite varied. According to the World Justice Project's Open Government Index 2015,³⁷ out of 102 countries Georgia is ranked at # 29, Ukraine at # 43, Moldova at # 46, the Russian Federation at # 67 and Turkey at # 82. There is no information available on Armenia and Azerbaijan. While these data need to be subject, of course, to rigorous examination, the question arises why *prima facie* Ukraine receives relatively good marks for openness of government while in the CPI it is described as the most corrupt country in the region.

A truly independent judiciary which is neither open to government interventions, „telephone justice“ nor to bribery by the parties is still an elusive goal in most, if not all countries of the region. Integrity is a central value.³⁸ When the courts are seen to be fairly enforcing the law, this creates a powerful incentive for individual parties to bring their complaints and drag into the open corruptive practices. A general impression of the current state of the independence of the judiciary in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) is offered by the

World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index 2015.³⁹ In a complex ranking that is based on 8 factors⁴⁰ Georgia ranks # 29, Moldova # 69, Ukraine #70, Russia # 75 and Turkey #80 out of 102 countries. Again, there is no information on Armenia and Azerbaijan, again the ranking of Ukraine seems rather benevolent.

Finally, self-interest can find its expression in the professional mission of an investigative journalism and a critical civil society. Contrary to older international law conventions on anti-corruption, UNCAC in Art 13 explicitly recognises the „active participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector such as civil society, non-governmental organisations and community-based organisations.“ Again, there is a host of literature on media's and civil society's⁴¹ role in anti-corruption. But when looking at the region(s) itself, it becomes clear that Western textbook approaches most often fail to recognise the complexities of the situation. The picture varies from repression of traditional NGOs to strong informal activities, especially driven by particular causes of popular discontent, to an overabundance of NGOs and a high donor-drivenness of civil society. Respected independent media with professional investigative journalism are rare if not absent, and most often there are committed individuals who use social media to bring public misconduct into the open. In general, independent media are not seen as the fourth estate as which they are commonly described in the West. Instead, the dominant perception is that of a „fifth column“, of muckrakers and troublemakers financed by foreign governments to undermine the state.

To summarize, in addressing the root causes of corruption in the region(s) it is not sufficient to follow international organisations' „toolkit approach“ and introduce and implement singular features. The fight against corruption can only become sustainable when an incentive structure is put in place that allows individuals to pull

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35 The only country of the region which did not ratify the Convention is the Russian Federation.

36 Art. 1 „Each Party shall provide in its internal law for effective remedies for persons who have suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to defend their rights and interests, including the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage.“

37 Available at <http://worldjusticeproject.org/open-government-index/open-government-around-world>.

38 *The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct* (2012) explicitly state: „3.2. The behaviour and conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done“.

39 Available at <http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index>

40 (1) Constraints on Government Powers, (2) Absence of Corruption, (3) Open Government, (4) Fundamental Rights, (5) Order and Security, (6) Regulatory Enforcement, (7) Civil Justice and (8) Criminal Justice.

41 For further references, see in particular Indira Carr and Opi Outhwaite, *The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Combating Corruption: Theory and Practice*, Suffolk University Law Review XLIV: 3 (2011) 615-664.

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corruption into the open. Ultimately, the fight against corruption cannot be waged in an isolated fashion, but it is part and parcel of what the EU's external action today stands for: openness of government, support to civil society and independent media, independence of the judiciary. From this point of view, anti-corruption and pro-integrity should be seen as part of the EU's Europeanisation agenda. But it would be wrong to believe that this task can be discharged by simply referring to the relevant instruments of the Council of Europe, the OECD and, most importantly, UNCAC. Instead, the EU – and in line with this mission also AESC – should focus its attention on the root causes of corruption and integrate the drive against corruption and pro integrity into the general instruments of the ENP and EaP in the region(s).

Designing a curriculum for anti-corruption and integrity

The aforementioned Art 13 at para (1) lit c) UNCAC obliges State Parties to undertake „public information activities that contribute to non-tolerance of corruption, as well as public education programmes, including school and university curricula; (...)”. So, for the first time governments across the world have entered into a *legal* obligation to introduce anti-corruption topics into university curricula.

Preceding this legal obligation, two other strands of development have been most effective. The first is the launch of the UN Global Compact as a worldwide corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative. Its Principle 10 calls upon business leaders to „work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.” The second is the adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG's). SDG no. 16 calls to: „Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” and contains a basket of anti-corruption and integrity-related sub-goals. Most central is 16.5. („Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms”) and 16.6. („Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”). While legally the UN Global Compact and the SDG's are soft law at best, they have led to a very fruitful innovation in the area of business and management education. Under the aegis of the aforementioned

PRME and with significant financial support of the Siemens Integrity Initiative, there is now a so-called „PRME Anti-Corruption Toolkit”⁴² available that is designed to provide comprehensive anti-corruption guidelines for curriculum change in business schools and management-related academic institutions around the world. Its eleven modules, which can be used individually or as a stand-alone course, aim to address the ethical, moral, and practical challenges that students will face in the marketplace. In parallel and arguably with a stronger focus on the legal dimension of fighting corruption, UNODC created a mechanism to bridge the gap between international organisations, governments and academia. The Anti-Corruption Academic Initiative (ACAD) was launched in Boston in May 2011 and is led by an expert group comprising a wide range of academics, governmental experts and officials from international organisations. North-eastern University along with the OECD and the International Bar Association (IBA) are supporting this project. Its most recent event was a symposium held on 30 and 31 October 2015 in co-operation with the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Centre (ROLACC), Doha / Qatar. Participants adopted a resolution which included, among others, the following recommendations:⁴³

„The participants of the Symposium of the ACAD initiative:

1. *Highlighting* the importance of anti-corruption ethics and integrity training for all students, public officials and professionals, as recognized in article 13 of the UN Convention against Corruption;
2. *Convinced* of the important role of academia and education as an effective way to build integrity and to prevent and combat corruption using multidisciplinary and action learning approaches; (...)
3. *Recommend* that academic institutions develop and teach anti-corruption courses and programmes for a wide range of disciplines and students and to integrate anti-corruption elements into other academic courses;

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⁴² See <http://actoolkit.unprme.org/>

⁴³ Available at <http://www.track.unodc.org/Education/Pages/ACAD.aspx>

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4. *Encourage* competent educational authorities to facilitate accreditation of anti-corruption courses;
5. *Recommend* that relevant national, regional, international and civil society organisations work with academia to support the teaching of anti-corruption and the dissemination and promotion of academic materials to the fullest extent possible. (...)"

As part of its efforts to promote awareness of the principles of UNCAC, UNODC has developed a full Academic Course on the Convention,⁴⁴ looking at the issue of corruption from a local, national and global perspective. This Course has been delivered in a variety of universities across the world, and there has also been a pilot to deliver it via video-conference involving Washington & Lee University in the U.S. and the University of Liberia, with a Vienna-based UNODC official giving outlines to the respective UNCAC chapters.

Obviously, both the „PRME Anti-Corruption Toolkit“ as well as the UNODC Academic Course are perfectly fit to be delivered by universities in the Black Sea and Caucasus region(s) without AESC involvement, drawing instead on PRME Working Group or ACAD members for support. But while the „PRME Anti-Corruption Toolkit“ is still not a ready-to-teach syllabus and not geared to legal education in the first place, the UNCAC-centered course may not do justice to the specificities of the region. There are basically two concerns which come to mind:

- While UNCAC prescriptions are legally binding in the countries concerned, there is the danger of „not seeing the forest for the trees“. UNCAC codifies an anti-corruption tool kit that is based on the experience of various regional fora, and of course, it is valuable for every student to know about these instruments. But taken together with the widely overlapping monitoring exercises which focus on the implementation of one or the other feature, there is the danger that students do not get to the root causes why implementation in the region(s) is often tantamount to window-dressing for the international community.
- ACAD members represent a great variety of

world-leading universities.⁴⁵ Some of them like MGIMO are culturally close to the region, but delivery through an external partner from outside the region will unavoidably result in a lack of contextualisation and the missed chance to create regional ownership in the teaching. Ideally, AESC member universities should collaborate with each other and develop a common stock of experience.

Apart from these concerns, both approaches do not incorporate the tools for e-learning that have come into existence during recent years and which, if suitably integrated, are capable of enhancing the learning experience of students significantly. Indeed, if only to summarise the latest developments in anti-corruption e-learning tools,⁴⁶ there is now a large variety of tools available to students free of charge. There are different techniques of delivery while substance ranges from a beginner's level to advanced issues.

- The E-Learning Platform for Neighbourhood⁴⁷ is the youngest member of the „family“, commissioned by the EU and implemented by the College of Europe. It came into existence only in March 2016. While covering basics on anti-corruption and thus being suitable for beginners, the style of delivery is rather disappointing. For the anti-corruption class there is a split-screen with an actor / talking head left and a PowerPoint presentation right. Interactive elements are limited to multiple choice testing at mid-level and at the end.
- UNODC offers its e-learning platform goLearn⁴⁸ on a large variety of topics including anti-corruption to officials from member states, international organisations, and other UN agencies and UNODC partners. However, it is possible to obtain from UNODC an individual student access for learning purposes. Content-wise, the material on anti-corruption is structured into one presentation for beginners and one for advanced listeners. The mode of delivery is

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⁴⁴ See <http://www.track.unodc.org/Education/Pages/AcademicCourse.aspx>

⁴⁵ See [the list of members](#)

⁴⁶ Interestingly, there are no explicit pro-integrity e-learning tools. Instead, issues of integrity are interwoven into the anti-corruption content of the mentioned tools.

⁴⁷ See <http://www.euforneighbourhood.eu/>

⁴⁸ See <https://golearn.unodc.org>

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unfortunately, very close to a presentation, with interspersed videos and multiple choice testing.

- The most exciting and well-done e-learning platform on anti-corruption is undoubtedly the one developed by UNODC with the UN Global Compact.⁴⁹

It is called „The Fight against Corruption” and focuses on the private sector and compliance developments based on Principle 10 of the UN Global Compact. The mode of delivery is actor-based and interactive. Through a series of scenes involving corrupt behaviour in business the student is asked to get involved in the actor's situation and advise him or her on doing the right thing. In addition, there is a host who neatly captures the main learning outcomes and puts them into context.

- Also extremely well-done is an online training course hosted on „Anti-Corruption Authorities”,⁵⁰ a platform created by the World Bank in collaboration with UNODC, the US State Department and the European Commission. Contrary to all the aforementioned tools, this training course is tailored to anti-corruption and governance practitioners. It invites the user to take part in the secondment of a member of the fictitious Exlandia Donor Consultation Group to the capital of Exlandia. The Prime Minister of Exlandia has requested the advice of the Donor Consultation Group on the feasibility of establishing an anti-corruption authority, and this fact-finding mission into the situation in Exlandia becomes some kind of stress test for the entire Donor Consultation Group.

Didactically speaking, the problem with all these e-learning tools is that they present a stand-alone teaching that offer at best a certificate to the successful participant. Including them into a face-to-face classroom situation is the solution which should create a win-win situation both for students and for universities who want to offer anti-corruption and pro-integrity classes without paying large amounts for fly-in faculty.

The way forward

In the future, and with a view to the upcoming call for Jean Monnet Support to Associations grants, it could present an interesting and rewarding task for AESC and DESCnet member universities to consider developing a blended learning class format for the region(s). By now, the author has developed a pilot syllabus to be implemented in the winter term 2016/17 at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University in Kharkiv (Ukraine). There is also the chance to teach this course at Kiev-Mohyla-Academy in co-operation with the Ukrainian European Studies Association. My suggestion is to create an AESC working group in which interested universities and individuals could get together and discuss the merits of such a programme.

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49 See <http://thefightagainstcorruption.org/>

50 See www.acauthorities.org

7 – New publications

Antonyan, Yulia
Elites and "Elites". Transformations of Social Structures in Post-Soviet Armenia and Georgia
Yerevan State University Publishing House: Yerevan 2016

This volume is the result of a joint, Armenian-Georgian anthropological survey of the concept of "elites" in contemporary Georgia and Armenia. The survey has embraced a set of topics related to the process of the formation of new national elites in the course of the construction of the nation-states, genealogy and typology of new elites, mechanisms and principles of organisation of power, old and new hierarchical structures, and their continuity with the cultural heritage of previous periods of history. Being both very much alike and very much distinctive from each other, Armenia and Georgia have developed social structures similar by form, yet discrepant through their inner interplay of meanings, interpretations and correlations of the parts of these structures. This study of elites, elitism and the elitist involves different social (and also ethnic and religious) groups, which have been affected by the process of reconfiguration of social structures.

Aliyev, Huseyn
Assessing the European Union's Assistance to Civil Society in Its Eastern Neighbourhood: Lessons from the South Caucasus
Journal of Contemporary European Studies Volume 24, Issue 1, 2016

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, assistance to civil society has been at the forefront of the European Union's (EU) strategy in its post-Soviet Eastern neighbourhood. The literature on the EU support to civil society in post-Soviet countries has so far primarily focused on democratisation and the research assessing the effects of EU assistance to civil society has been limited. This study builds on existing literature about the EU cooperation with civil society in the South Caucasus by focusing on the following question. How successful were the EU's efforts in supporting civil society in the South Caucasus so far? By relying on a combination of qualitative elite interviews and secondary sources, this article assesses the impact of the key EU initiatives and programmes implemented in the South Caucasus during the past two decades. It is concluded here that despite steady improvements of EU policies and approaches of empowering civil actors in the region, the European Union's assistance to civil society in the South Caucasus region remains inconsistent and limited.

Broers, Laurence
Resourcing De-facto Jurisdictions: A Theoretical Perspective on Cases in the South Caucasus
Caucasus Survey 2016 Vol. 3 No. 3 pp. 269-290

Political economy is a consistently under-researched aspect of unrecognised statehood. Countering homogenising accounts centred on illegality, this article argues for a comparative analysis in order to arrive at a more differentiated and case-sensitive understanding of how the political economies of de facto jurisdictions in the post-Soviet space function. Drawing on theoretical insights from the literatures analysing late, peripheral and post-colonial political economies, this article argues that de facto elites in such entities strategise differently according to the resources and external relationships available to them. Three contrasting ideal-type models of resource extraction are proposed for contemporary de facto jurisdictions: subsistent, rentier and monopoly mediator. Each model has follow-on implications for the nature of political regime, pluralism and development, and examples of each model drawing on cases in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are briefly surveyed.

Broers, Laurence
Diffusion and Default: A Linkage and Leverage Perspective on the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict
East European Politics 2016 Vol. 32 No. 3 pp. 378-399

This article applies the concepts of linkage and leverage to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. While other post-Soviet conflicts feature cross-border linkages reinforcing the axes of conflict, this study reveals patterns of multi-directional, fragmented and cross-cutting linkages with a wide range of external actors. This pattern has diffused leverage potentials of external actors, accounting for the lack of decisive shifts in the direction of either conflict escalation or resolution, or regime renewal. The resulting linkage/leverage structure has proven stable but hinges on a tension between diffuse international leverage and a collective default among international actors to conflict management rather than resolution.

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7 – New publications (cont.)

Cecire, Michael Hikari

The Merchant Hegemon: Georgia's Role in Turkey's Caucasus System

available on www.academia.edu

With its own rich history in the region, Turkey looks to be reclaiming its long-lost influence in the South Caucasus. Driven by its "Strategic Depth" doctrine, Turkey has cultivated strong ties with Georgia as a strategic partner. Today, Turkey is visibly ascendant as a Caucasus power. This has been especially propelled by the gradual transformation of Turkish outreach to the region from the bilateral to the trilateral level – Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Even bilateral talks and agreements are increasingly being subsumed within a larger appreciation for broader, trilateral implications. The emergence of an increasingly coherent trilateral grouping between Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan could overturn traditional conceptions of the region as the domain of Russia.

Emerson, Michael / Kovziridze, Tamara (eds.)

Deepening EU-Georgian Relations: What, Why and How?

Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Reformatics, Tbilisi and Rowman and Littlefield International, London, 2016

This Handbook seeks to explain the contents of a long and complex treaty, the Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), between Georgia on the one hand, and the European Union (EU) and its 28 member states, on the other. Like most complex legal texts, it cannot be read like a book. The purpose here is therefore to make it possible for anyone to understand what each chapter of the Agreement means, in terms of both the nature of the commitments that the parties have assumed, and the prospects for their implementation. In writing this Handbook, the authors had a broad range of readers in mind, including officials, parliamentarians, business leaders, lawyers and business consultants, think tanks, civil society organisations, university teachers, trainers, students and journalists.

Gabrielyan, Vahe / Stroobants, Peter / Berg, Eiki **How Do You Tailor Diplomatic Training? Sizing up Peer Institutions and their Training Practices for the Diplomatic School of Armenia**

Global Affairs 2016 (published online 8.8.2016, not yet in print)

The Diplomatic School of Armenia (established in 2009) explored how its peer institutions were organised, how they tailored their training programmes and how any existing structures and practices could be suited for Armenia. This paper forms part of a comparative study which was carried out in 2013-2014. We include a sample for 14 institutes and training centres, ranging from countries which had diplomatic training fully integrated into the ministerial structures to those where the institute had become an entirely separate entity; including states where training focused strictly on skills development, as well as those cases where the focus had turned to offering post-graduate studies. It appears that all peer institutions have followed unprecedented development paths, becoming today's diplomatic training centres, school and academies. This made the tailoring exercise for Armenia even more challenging.

Gachechiladze, Mariam

Russia's Georgian Diaspora and Georgian-Russian Relations

Caucasian House: Tbilisi 2016

The report was prepared in 2015 based on the sociological study performed as part of the project 'Georgian-Russian relations for peace and cooperation'. The aim of the project was to study Georgian diaspora organisations in Russia through the analysis of their objectives, activities and institutional development.

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7 – New publications (cont.)

Gerrits, Andre W.M. / Bader, Max
Russian Patronage over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Implications for Conflict Resolution

East European Politics 2016 Vol. 32 No. 3 pp. 279-313

This article applies the concepts of linkage and leverage as developed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way to Russia's involvement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two quasi-independent states in the South Caucasus. Through this re-conceptualisation of the developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, combined with new empirical insights, the article aims to increase our understanding of the conflicts in the region, of the involvement of the Russian Federation in particular, and consequently of the prospects of international conflict resolution. Compared to other political entities in the former Soviet Union, Abkhazia and South Ossetia represent an extreme case of Russian linkage and leverage. This article focuses on the period after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, when Russia recognised the regions' independence and effectively turned them into Russian protectorates. The economic, intergovernmental, technocratic and social linkages between Russia and the two regions are extraordinarily deep, and they directly undermine the autonomy of the regions. The post-war delegation of Russian cadres and institutional and legislative diffusion creates additional linkages underpinning Russian leverage.

Hoch, Tomáš / Kopecek, Tomáš / Baar, Vladimír
Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in De Facto States. The Case of Abkhazia

Problems of Post-Communism 2016 (not yet in print)

De facto states are considered to be highly specific entities, thus meriting a detailed analysis of how conflict transformation functions within such states and what role is played in them by civil society organisations (CSOs), which are traditionally considered one of the key actors in conflict transformation. The authors discuss the factors that limit the activities of these CSOs as a result of the restricted sovereignty of de facto states. The study is based on three field research projects focusing on CSOs in Abkhazia, carried out in 2009, 2014 and 2015.

Kuchins, Andrew C. / Mankoff, Jeffrey / Backes, Oliver

Azerbaijan in a Reconnecting Eurasia. Foreign Economic and Security Interests

Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington D.C. 2016, published also with Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham MD 2016.

To better understand the geo-political and geoeconomic environment confronting the South Caucasus states, starting in 2014, members of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program travelled to the region and conducted interviews with a wide range of government officials, experts, private-sector actors, and representatives of international organisations to understand how elites in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia perceive the economic and security environment changing around them. This report and the others in the series reflect what we gleaned from these interviews, along with analysis of published data and secondary literature, to provide a broad overview of how the world looks from the perspective of the South Caucasus. As in our earlier report series on Central Asia, the emphasis in these reports is the foreign economic and security policies of the three states. While we are cognizant of the complex situation surrounding domestic politics and human rights in some of these countries, the focus of this particular project is the strategic implications of a reconnecting Eurasia— in other words, how the states of the South Caucasus interact with each other and with the outside world. We address domestic issues, including human rights, corruption, and authoritarian practices, to the extent that they affect the interactions between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, on the one hand, and the rest of the world, on the other

Broers, Laurence

Mirrors to the World: The Claims to Legitimation and International Recognition of De Facto States in the South Caucasus

The Brown Journal of World Affairs XX:2 (2014) 145-159

No abstract available.

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7 — New publications (cont.)

Lanzillotti, Ian T.

"The Sleeping Beauty of the Caucasus": Kavkazskii Uzel and Contemporary Views on Politics and Security in Kabardino-Balkaria

Journal of Caucasian Studies 2016 Vol. 1 No. 2 pp. 143-176

In the post-Soviet North Caucasus, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, where political tensions among its constituent nationalities are never far from the surface, long sat precariously between the region's peaceful northwest and its tumultuous northeast. Observers of the political and security situation in the North Caucasus have long viewed the multi-ethnic Kabardino-Balkar Republic as integral to the fate of the region as a whole. During the first fifteen years of post-Soviet history, Kabardino-Balkaria was conspicuous for its absence of violent conflict and relative inter-communal accord. Several Islamist-led attacks in 2004 and, more violently and infamously, 2005 shattered any illusions of Kabardino-Balkaria's immunity to the violence that had plagued much of the region since in recent years. By 2010 and 2011 assassinations of high-ranking officials and public figures and attacks on police patrols reached a peak, and Kabardino-Balkaria ranked alongside Ingushetia and Dagestan as one of Russia's most violent regions. Since late 2012, however, the scale and frequency of these attacks have diminished significantly.

This article uses social media as a lens to analyse the attitudes of residents of Kabardino-Balkaria toward issues of politics and security in the region. This article pays particular attention to commentators' views on the Islamist insurgency and its ideological opponents (Circassian/Kabardian and Balkar national activists and the republic's ruling elite). Specifically, this article analyses the content of Kabardino-Balkaria-related discussion forums on the popular Caucasus news and analysis website Caucasian Knot (Kavkazskii Uzel). This analysis is contextualised with a brief ethnographic and historical survey of inter-communal relations, Islam, and politics in Kabardino-Balkaria.

Lonardo, David

The Islamic State and the Connections to Historical Networks of Jihadism in Azerbaijan
Caucasus Survey, published online 22.8.2016

This article provides an empirical account of connections between the Islamic State (IS) and jihadi networks in Azerbaijan. Prior to the Syrian civil war, jihadist groups in Azerbaijan were primarily connected to the insurgency in the North Caucasus. However, the crackdown on Salafi groups after the 2008 Abu Bakr mosque bombing and the re-established Forest Brothers in 2012 led to the departure of many jihadists. Drawing on primary online and social media sources, the article traces how these individuals became the vanguard of Azerbaijani groups in Syria. While initially holding some high-level positions in foreign fighter groups in Syria, Azerbaijanis have suffered hardships as part of the IS. Many of their leaders appear to have been executed by the IS and many fighters were used as cannon fodder during the battles of Kobane and Tel Abyad. Despite a possible early policy of allowing jihadist aspirants to leave the country, the Azerbaijani government has stepped up efforts against returnees. Overall, the IS does not appear to be a major threat to Azerbaijan in the near to midterm.

Makarychev, Andrey / Yatsyk, Alexandra

Celebrating Border Lands in a Wider Europe. Nations and Identities in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia.

Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2016

The book addresses Estonian, Ukrainian and Georgian identities that develop against the background of the neo-imperial policies of Russia and EU normative power projection. With the decreasing explanatory value of the "post-Soviet" frame, the authors propose the concept of borderlands for bringing together a group of countries located at the intersection of different cultural, religious, ethnic and civilizational flows and systems.

